Waterloo, 1815: Who Defeated Napoleon?
Sumeru & Seed Editorial BoardThe British say Wellington. The Germans say Blücher. The French have blamed Ney, Grouchy, the rain and the Emperor's health. Two hundred years on, the best answer to the most famous question in military history is: all of them, together.
On the morning of 19 June 1815, back in Brussels from a ridge twenty kilometres to the south, the Duke of Wellington told a friend that the battle of the day before had been "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life."1 He was right, and the closeness of it is why the argument about credit has never stopped.
Four days in June
Napoleon had returned from Elba in March and retaken France without a shot. The powers of Europe declared him an outlaw and began to assemble some 700,000 men. His only chance was to strike before they were ready. Two allied armies lay in Belgium: about 95,000 British, Dutch, Belgian and German troops under Wellington, and about 120,000 Prussians under Field Marshal Blücher. Together they outnumbered him almost two to one. He would have to beat them one at a time.
On 15 June he crossed the frontier with 125,000 men and drove between them. On the 16th he beat the Prussians at Ligny, while Marshal Ney fought Wellington to a draw at the crossroads of Quatre Bras. Blücher, aged seventy-two, was ridden over in a cavalry charge and for some hours his chief of staff, Gneisenau, commanded. Here the campaign was decided — though no one knew it. Instead of retreating east along their supply line toward Germany, the Prussians fell back north to Wavre, staying within a day's march of Wellington. Napoleon sent Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men to follow them, and turned on the Duke.2
The ridge
Wellington stopped at a position he had noted a year before: the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean, near the village of Waterloo, with the farms of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte as outworks in front. He had about 68,000 men. Little more than a third were British; the rest were Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Nassauers, the King's German Legion, Dutch and Belgians. He stood there on one condition, which Blücher had promised in writing: that the Prussians would come.
Heavy rain fell all night. Napoleon, with 72,000 men and a great superiority in guns, waited until late morning for the ground to dry. Then the French attacked all day. At Hougoumont a diversion grew into a battle that swallowed a French corps. About half past one d'Erlon's corps, 16,000 men in massive columns, reached the crest and was thrown back by Picton's infantry and a charge of British heavy cavalry — which rode on too far and was wrecked in its turn. From four o'clock Ney, believing the allied line was giving way, led thousands of cavalry again and again against infantry squares that would not break. About six, La Haye Sainte fell at last, its German defenders out of ammunition, and Wellington's centre was open to French guns at close range. "Night or the Prussians must come," he is said to have remarked.
The Prussians come
They had been coming since half past four. Bülow's corps, after a march across sodden country lanes, attacked the village of Plancenoit behind the French right. Napoleon had to send his reserve to hold it: Lobau's corps, then the Young Guard, then battalions of the Old Guard. Those were the men he needed to finish Wellington. By evening some 50,000 Prussians were on the field.
About half past seven Napoleon sent in what remained of the Imperial Guard against Wellington's ridge. It was met by British Guards rising from the corn, and taken in flank by the 52nd Light Infantry and by Dutch and Belgian troops under Chassé. For the first time in its history the Guard fell back. The cry "La Garde recule!" ran along the French line; at the same moment Zieten's Prussians broke in at its north-east corner. The army dissolved. The French lost some 25,000 killed and wounded and thousands of prisoners; Wellington about 15,000; the Prussians about 7,000.
So who won?
Wellington's army could not have won alone: by seven o'clock it was holding on by its fingernails, and he had only fought there because Blücher was coming. The Prussians could not have won alone either: had the ridge given way at five, they would have marched into a victorious French army. Each made the other's victory possible — which was what the two commanders had agreed at Tirlemont in May and what Gneisenau's retreat to Wavre preserved.3
And Napoleon helped. He started late, left the attacks to Ney, never recalled Grouchy — who heard the guns and marched on to Wavre as ordered — and kept back the Guard until it was too late for it to matter. Even a victory would probably only have delayed the end: Austrian and Russian armies were already marching on the Rhine. Waterloo was won by a coalition, and that is the real answer. In the wars of his age Napoleon was beaten, in the end, not by a better general but by enemies who had finally learned to stay together.
Notes
- As recorded by Thomas Creevey, who spoke with Wellington in Brussels the next morning (The Creevey Papers). ↩
- On the Prussian decisions see Peter Hofschröer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign (2 vols., 1998–99) — a deliberately pro-Prussian corrective — and, for balance, Gareth Glover, Waterloo: Myth and Reality (2014). ↩
- Alessandro Barbero, The Battle: A New History of Waterloo (Eng. trans. 2005); Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days that Changed Europe's Destiny (2014). ↩
Further Reading
- Alessandro Barbero, The Battle: A New History of Waterloo (2005).
- Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days that Changed Europe's Destiny (2014).
- Gareth Glover, Waterloo: Myth and Reality (2014).
- Peter Hofschröer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign (1998–99).
