From the Seven Years' War to American Independence: One Long War for a Continent

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The shots that began the Seven Years' War were fired by a twenty-two-year-old Virginian officer named George Washington. Twenty years later the same man led an army against the king he had served — with France, the old enemy, as his ally.

Britain's greatest victory of the eighteenth century and its greatest defeat were twenty years apart, and the first caused the second.

A skirmish in the Ohio woods

In May 1754 a small party of Virginia militia and Mingo warriors surprised a French detachment in a glen south of the forks of the Ohio. The Virginians were led by Lieutenant Colonel George Washington, aged twenty-two. A French officer, Jumonville, was killed; the French called it murder. Within weeks Washington had surrendered his stockade, Fort Necessity, and within two years the quarrel over the Ohio country had become a war fought in Europe, India, West Africa, the Caribbean and the Philippines. "A volley fired by a young Virginian in the backwoods of America," wrote Horace Walpole, "set the world on fire."1

Americans remember it as the French and Indian War, Europeans as the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). It went badly for Britain at first — General Braddock's column was destroyed on the Monongahela in 1755, with Washington among the survivors — and then spectacularly well. Under William Pitt, Britain paid Frederick the Great of Prussia to hold France's armies in Germany while the Royal Navy and the redcoats took France's colonies. Quebec fell in 1759, Montreal in 1760.

Victory and the bill

By the Peace of Paris in 1763 France gave up Canada and everything east of the Mississippi. For the thirteen colonies this removed the enemy that had made British protection necessary. For London it produced a bill. The national debt had nearly doubled, to about £133 million, and ministers decided to keep some ten thousand regulars in America and to ask the colonists — lightly taxed, and now safe — to help pay for them.2

Every step that followed was reasonable in London and intolerable in Boston. The Proclamation of 1763 closed the lands beyond the Appalachians to settlement, to keep peace with the Native nations after Pontiac's War — and so denied the colonists the prize they thought they had fought for. The Stamp Act of 1765 taxed their newspapers and legal papers; it was repealed after riots and boycotts. The Townshend duties of 1767 brought troops to Boston, and in 1770 soldiers fired on a crowd. The Tea Act led to the Boston Tea Party in December 1773, the Tea Party to the Coercive Acts, and those to the shooting at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775.

The same men, the other side

The officers of the new war had learned their trade in the old one. Washington had served beside Thomas Gage, who now commanded the king's troops in Boston. Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, his senior generals, had been British regulars under Braddock. The militia colonels who dug in on Breed's Hill in June 1775 — Israel Putnam, John Stark, William Prescott — were veterans of the campaigns against Canada. On 15 June Congress made Washington commander-in-chief; on 4 July 1776 it declared independence.

France returns

A colonial rebellion could defy the British army. It could not defeat the Royal Navy. That needed a great power, and one was waiting. France had spent the years since 1763 rebuilding its fleet. When General Burgoyne's army, marching south from Canada, surrendered at Saratoga in October 1777, Louis XVI's ministers were convinced the Americans could win. Benjamin Franklin signed the treaties of alliance and commerce in Paris on 6 February 1778; Spain and the Dutch Republic later joined the war against Britain.3

It ended where sea and land power met. In September 1781 Admiral de Grasse's fleet beat off the British at the mouth of the Chesapeake, while Washington and the Comte de Rochambeau marched their armies four hundred miles from the Hudson to Virginia. Cornwallis, shut up in Yorktown with no fleet to take him off, surrendered on 19 October. There were more French soldiers and sailors at Yorktown than American ones.

The last link in the chain

A second Peace of Paris, in 1783, recognised the United States. France had its revenge and little else: the war had cost over a billion livres, mostly borrowed. The effort to pay the interest forced the king to summon the Estates-General in 1789.4 The war that began in an Ohio glen thus made one republic directly and another indirectly — and the young officers who had served in America, Lafayette among them, went home with ideas.

Play this history. The United States and Britain are both free to play in Chapter VIII of Sumeru Chess: Saratoga, Cowpens and the road to Yorktown. Open Sumeru Chess →

Notes

  1. Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II. The standard modern account of the war and its consequences is Fred Anderson, Crucible of War (2000). ↩
  2. Anderson, Crucible of War, part VII; on the debt see also John Brewer, The Sinews of Power (1989). ↩
  3. Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (1985). ↩
  4. On French finances after the American war see William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (3rd ed., 2018), ch. 3. ↩

Further Reading

  • Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (2000).
  • Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789 (rev. ed., 2005).
  • John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (2007).
  • Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (1985).
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Chapter VIII · 1776–1815

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